Introduction
Cryptography is not sufficient for implementing secure exchange of secrets or authentification. Logical flaws in the protocol design may lead to incorrect behavior even under the idealized assumption of perfect cryptography. Most of protocol verification tools are model-checking tools for bounded number of sessions, bounded number of participants and in many case also a bounded size of messages [11, 8, 5, 10] . In general, they are applied to discover flaws in cryptographic protocols. On the contrary, tools based on induction and theorem proving provide a general proof strategy [9, 4] , but they are either not automatic with exception of [4] or the termination is not guaranteed.
In this paper, we present Hermes, a tool dedicated to the verification of secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. Hermes places no restriction on the size of messages, neither on the number of participants, nor on the number of sessions. Given a protocol and a secret, Hermes provides either an attack or an invariant on the intruder knowledge that guarantees that the secret will not be revealed by executing the protocol. Moreover, when a protocol is proved correct, it returns a proof tree that can be exploited for certification. Hermes is available online from the authors' webpage.
The Model and the Verification Method
We give a sketchy idea of the verification method underlying Hermes. A formal and complete presentation of this method can be found in [1] . Cryptographic protocols can be modeled as a set of transitions of the form t → t where t, t are terms contructed by applying pairing and the encryption operator { } K , to some free variables and the parameters of a session, which are the principals, the fresh nonces, and the fresh keys of the session. The intruder is modeled by additional transitions due to Dolev-Yao [6] . They can be seen as a deductive system that describes the messages that the intruder can deduce and forge from the messages sent during the protocols execution. A secrecy goal states that several designated messages (the secrets) should not be made public: a secret s is defined by a term too.
Description of a Protocol and Its Properties
Along the paper we illustrate the main step of the verification on the NeedhamSchroeder-Lowe Protocol. Its specification is given below in LaEva, a high level specification language designed for describing security protocols and their properties. It is compiled by EvaTrans into a concrete operational model and a property to check that both constitute the inputs to three automatic verification tools developped in the Eva project: Securify [4] , Cpv [7] and Hermes [1] . s.session* {A,B,Na,Nb} This specification leads to three rules parameterized by (A, B, N a , N b ) (see below). Then, a session of the protocol is completely defined by instantiating the roles A and B with some principals, and N a , N b with two fresh nonces. On the other hand, n 1 and n 2 denote free variables which are local to the session.
Abstraction and Verification Steps
We reduce the model with unbounded number of sessions in parallel to an finite set of rules which can be applied infinitely and in any order. The rule are obtained by applying the safe abstraction of [3] that distinguishes only one honest principal H and the intruder I. Identifying principals means also identifying their nonces and keys. Hence, the session to consider are reduced to: the session we observe, i.e. (H, H, N a , N [1] for details. Given this abstract model of the protocol, Hermes computes the set of messages that protect the secrets in all sent messages. Intuitively, such protections are terms of the form {x} K where the inverse key K −1 is not known by the intruder. The hypotheses on secret keys are used to define an initial superset P of protecting messages, which is then refined by a fixpoint computation. At each step, one transition t → t of the abstract protocol is analyzed and bad protections are removed from P or new secrets are added to S, see [1] for details.
The infinite set P of protections is represented as two sets (G, B) of terms. Roughly speaking, the pair (G, B) is meant for the set of ground messages that are instances of (good) terms in G but do not unify with (bad) terms of B.
We provided Hermes with a widening operator that forces termination in the presence of rules that can loop and produce an infinite set of growing bad terms. At termination, Hermes yields an augmented set of secrets S (S ⊆ S ) and either a representation of a set of protecting messages P (P ⊆ P ) that protect S or an attack in case a secret is revealed.
Application to Our Running Example
We illustrate our approach on the abstract model of the Needham-SchroederLowe Protocol. Hermes starts with the set of secrets S = {N a , N b , prk(H)}, the set of good patterns G = {{x s } pbk(H) } and an empty set of bad patterns. The fixpoint computation leads to the same set of secrets, the same good patterns and an augmented set of bad protections B that consists in four patterns:
sup(xs, I),H} pbk(H) ; {xs, I} pbk(H) ; {Na, sup(xs, I),H} pbk(H)
The first one of these bad patterns is obtained from Hermes stops when no new bad pattern or secret are generated. We then conclude that the protocol satisfies the secrecy property in all initial configurations where the secrets in S appears only in messages in compliance with (G, B ). In our example, the nonces N a and N b of S do not put constraints on the initial configurations since they do not appear at all before the observed session. Finally, the set of secrets S restricts the initial configurations to those where the key prk(H) was never sent, or sent with a protection in compliance with (G, B ).
In the original version of the protocol due to Needham-Schroeder, the identity of role B did not appear in message 2. Applied to this version, Hermes requires {H, N HI a } pbk(H) to be secret. Obviously, this message can be forged by the intruder. The exploration tree computed by Hermes shows an attack that reveals the secret N b . This corresponds to the well known attack discovered by Lowe.
Experimental Results and Future Work
The following table summarizes the results obtained by Hermes for secrecy properties of protocols from Clark-Jacob's survey [2] . Surprisingly we have not encountered any false attack on any of these protocols, although one could construct a protocol that leads to a false attack. We are currently working on extracting a proof for the Coq prover from the exploration tree provided by Hermes. 
